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The republics of Tajikistan and Georgia in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, respectively, are
both small Soviet successor states. Their postindependence history was one of the political vola-
tilities and instabilities until the mid-2000s. Nevertheless, these independent countries have even-
tually developed diverging policies, notably with regard to their political alliances and world
orientations. Although contingent and actor-driven factors may have influenced the outcome,
the influence of structural factors has been far greater than those agency-driven factors.1
In many ways, the Tajikistani Civil War resembles that of the Chechen Conflict (1991–2009,
ongoing low-intensity conflict) and also helps us understand the Syrian Conflict (2011–pre-
sent). Similar to Georgia, Tajikistan experienced the collapse of state institutions more
intensely than other Soviet republics. It is worth mentioning that during the last days of the
former Soviet Union Tajikistan had the highest rate of demonstrations per capita amongst all
Central Asian republics.2 In all these three cases, internal conflicts triggered (to varying
degrees) regional conflicts as foreign states and (Islamist) militias interfered in them. The
Tajikistani Civil War was the bloodiest conflict in the post-Soviet space after the Chechen War.
Despite the fact that Georgia has not been an arena of continuous armed conflict, the some-
times ‘frozen’ sometimes ‘melted’ conflicts have had a profound impact on the political, eco-
nomic and social affairs in that country. As a young man, a veteran of 2008 Georgian-Russian
War told me: ‘Georgia has had a history of wars. Do you believe me? I am in my early 30s, yet
I have experienced three wars in my lifetime.’
This review article is primarily based on the books listed below. The scope of this review
article is neither writing separate critical book reviews, nor comparing those volumes with
each other. Therefore, this list does not necessarily include only recent books, as these books
are enlisted primarily for their relevance to this article’s discussion. After having read a num-
ber of recent and less recent works on this issue – broadly speaking – I try to discuss a num-
ber of relevant issues about political stability, transition and conflict. The information and
insight acquired from these works help debate and understand the political transitions and
conflict in these two countries. Hopefully they also offer solid insight and knowledge to
understand and explain political transitions and conflict in general, or at least in similar cases.
Even though in this current article some of the mentioned works weigh heavier than others,
all these selected books form the corpus and backbone of this essay and are added with other
relevant material.
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Situating Tajikistan and Georgia
A decade after its termination, Tim Epkenhans’s monograph, entitled The Origins of the Civil War
in Tajikistan: Nationalism, Islamism, and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Space, pays attention to one
of the bloodiest civil wars in the (post-) Soviet space. This study is very opportune as a reflection
on certain events – and their narratives – contribute to a critical understanding of a theme and
hence credibility of a study. The reason for this is that more theoretical and factual sources
become available after a period of time. Many of these sources were produced earlier and yet
they were not given enough attention by scholars. Second, and perhaps more important, after a
period of time moods may have been tempered, politicians and key figures may have adjusted
their views, and authors are less inclined to take sides, or be accused of taking sides. Finally,
every work, especially those produced after a period of time, tends to reflect upon (unexplained)
facts and issues, and every scholar’s reflection has its own authentic value.
Epkenhans’s study is a formidable and comprehensive work by a scholar with substantial
knowledge of the Middle East and Central Asia. The author uses sources in Persian, Tajik,
Russian, English, German and French. The frequent citations from the Tajik and Persian sources
demonstrate the author’s proficiency in these languages. Although Tajik can be regarded as a
Persian dialect, its Cyrillic orthography, phonology and vocabulary renders it ‘unworkable’ for
modal Persian-speakers from Iran. Generally, an author’s linguistic skills may add to the accuracy
of his or her discussion.
In addition to diverse published and unpublished sources, Epkenhans uses memoirs of a num-
ber of key figures in the Tajikistani Civil war; these include Safarali Kenjaev, who organized the
presidential campaign of the former president Rahmon Nabiev (1991) who in turn awarded him
the position of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Shodmon Yusuf, a former member of the
communist party who later co-established the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) and lived in
exile in Iran, Asliddin Sohibnazar, another co-founder of DPT, Buri Karim(ov), deputy chairman of
‘the Council of Ministers’ (1988–1990), Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, the Qozikalon,3 that is, the highest
Islamic religious authority in Tajikistan (1988–1993), and Ibrohim Usmonov, the minister of com-
munication (1992–1993) and a key figure in the peace negotiations between 1994 and 1997,
who remained an advisor to President Imomali Rahmon(ov) until 2004. In addition, Epkenhans
uses published and unpublished materials, which he collectively names Islamic Renaissance Party
of Tajikistan’s (IRPT) Counter Discourse.4 The author compares these authors’ ‘narratives’ with a
certain hegemonic narrative that he calls the ‘master narrative’ of the Tajikistani Civil War and
comes to certain conclusions that in turn add to the understanding of this civil war. Although
selection of only certain key figures may add to a certain bias in a researcher’s conclusion, this
may not necessarily be so if the researcher gives all these sources the same degree of scrutiny.
After all, all analyses are dependent on human knowledge and analytic skills, and therefore
inevitably reflect, to a certain degree, their authors’ ‘own’ interpretation of facts.
Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet
Union is the title of Jonathan Wheatley’s book originally published in 2005 and republished in
2017. It is cited several hundreds of times. Not surprisingly, because even though the primary
scope of this book is about the Rose revolution (2003) in the former Soviet republic of Georgia,
its insight and the conclusions it draws have wider relevance and applications. Its main purpose
is to explain the Rose Revolution in Georgia and it also tries to answer whether structural or
agent-based factors can better explain this transition of power.5
Its wider relevance and applications are both thematic and regional. As it describes the polit-
ical history of Georgia since perestroika in the late 1980s, it also gives insight about the nature
of governance, (ethnic) nationalism and conflicts in the later period of the Soviet Union and
independent Georgia. It has wider regional relevancy as the Soviet legacy renders political his-
tory and dynamics of public administration, governance and ethno-territorial conflicts similar
across the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, while this study is insightful for understanding and
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explaining similar phenomena in certain small states elsewhere in the world, yet one still has to
be cautious when one wants to generalize the conclusions and theoretical insight of this study
to across all of the former Soviet Union and its successor states. The author maintains that this
study has case-specific features mainly found in Georgian culture, the level of foreign influence
and collapse of state institutions. As the author correctly mentions ‘the collapse of state struc-
tures during the period 1991–1994 was more marked in Georgia than in any other former Soviet
republic with the exception of Tajikistan’.6
I agree with the author to a great extent with regard to these groups of factors. I agree com-
pletely with the fact that in no other former Soviet republic was the magnitude of state collapse
as largely felt as in Tajikistan and Georgia. As I will further argue, I tend to agree with Wheatley
about the international and cultural factors, but perhaps also because of different arguments. In
the decade since Wheatley wrote his book more has become obvious with regard to the magni-
tude and the nature of international influences. In addition, as a cultural and political geog-
rapher, I have a more focused eye on ethno-territorial and cultural factors, especially when they
are (perceived as) structural factors. Therefore, in this article I will also pay attention to
such factors.
Indeed, a comparison between the recent political history of Tajikistan and Georgia is useful,
because despite many similarities in the size of population, territory and the level of state col-
lapse, these cases show different outcomes in regime transition and international orientation. In
Tajikistan, factions from the former communist elite succeeded in consolidating and eventually
monopolizing, to a rather high degree, political, cultural social and economic power, whereas in
Georgia the former communists were briefly deposed from power to be replaced again by non-
communist reformers after a decade. John Heathershaw’s study entitled, Post-conflict Tajikistan:
The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of Legitimate Order,7 about the discourses of
peace-building in the post-Conflict Tajikistan describes the recent state of affairs in Tajikistan
quite well.8 Nowadays, Tajikistan has a Eurasianist geopolitical orientation, that is, it is aligned
with its Central Asian neighbours and Russia, and it is also a member of the Shanghai
Cooperation, whereas Georgia has a Western-oriented, or arguably more independent, inter-
national orientation, as it (at least rhetorically) even aspires to NATO membership and has signed
an association agreement with the European Union.9
Yet, despite many other differences in their ethno-religious make-up and level of wealth, they
also show similar outcomes as both states were involved in civil wars and one should not forget
the ethno-territorial conflicts either, be they of varying degrees of duration and intention.
Tajikistan was perhaps the poorest Soviet republic, whereas Georgia has been one of the more
affluent Soviet republics and as Wheatley mentions Georgians had the highest per capita ratio of
membership in the Communist party than any other ethnic group, even Russians, in the Soviet
Union.10 Party membership, especially in a one-party political and planned economic system,
means provision of more resources for one’s own regional, ethnic or political group. The rela-
tively high Georgian participation in the former Soviet political life is manifested in figures such
as Iosiba Vissarionis dze Jughashvili – better known as Stalin – Lavrenti Beria and not forgetting
Eduard Shevardnadze. The majority of Georgians (of Georgia) are Georgian Orthodox Christians,
whereas Tajiks are Sunni Muslims. Georgia and Tajikistan, both, show a very chequered ‘mosaic’
type of ethnogeographic configuration.11 This fact, that is, the ethno-religious heterogeneity of
Tajikistan, is often underestimated mainly because of the fact that the Pamiri people(s) have not
been registered as a separate ethnic or ethnoreligious group in the consecutive censuses since
1936. Although they are bi lingual in Tajik, Pamiri people speak one of the several Pamiri lan-
guages – the largest ones being Shughni and Wakhi – and are Ismaili Shia Muslims, whereas
(other) Tajiks are Sunni Muslims and speak a Central Asian Persian dialect written in an adjusted
form of the Cyrillic alphabet. Although he does not discuss the political and cultural peculiarities
of Pamiri identity in great detail, Epkenhans does indeed pay attention to the Pamiri and Uzbek
factors.12 However, a more deliberate focus on the roles and perceptions of these two groups
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would certainly add to the value of this already valuable work. I would have paid more attention
to the ethno-religious realities of Tajikistan were I to write a similar book. I should say, neverthe-
less, that I could have not written such a book as it requires access to a wide range of primary
and secondary sources and deep knowledge of the state of affairs in Tajikistan that I currently
lack. Using memoirs of certain key figures and other published and unpublished sources, Tim
Epkenhans tries to explain the root causes and the nature of the Tajikistani Civil War in his
masterpiece.
Wheatley legitimately questions whether or not the Rose Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili’s
presidency brought about substantial changes in Georgian political culture and its state of affairs.
An answer to this question should logically be the task of studies done after Wheatley’s study.
Certainly, the way of governance of the Soviet and Shevardnadze’s periods could not be undone
overnight. However, after the Rose Revolution Georgia regained its full sovereignty over Adjara
which, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, was ruled as a personal fiefdom of Aslan
Abashidze. Also, the rule of law was strengthened. Bribe-taking by police – still a widespread
practice in certain former Soviet republics in the first decade of 2000 – was uprooted, and
eventually, thanks to the newly achieved economic progress, attracted some foreign investment.
The state of affairs after the Rose revolution is discussed fairly by Stephen Jones and his asso-
ciates in two books, one edited volume entitled War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia
Ablaze13 and a monograph by Stephen Jones entitled Georgia: A Political History since
Independence.14 The latter book also pays fair attention to ethno-territorial conflicts and in gen-
eral to the ethnic and religious map of Georgia in more detail than Wheatley does. All in all, the
aforementioned edited volume also answers that question in a rather positive way. As it was
published after the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 – after which Russia recognized South
Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence – this book also pays more attention to the (root) causes
of ethno-territorial conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia than Wheatley’s book does. As men-
tioned before, ethno-territorial conflicts are not the main scope of Wheatley’s book. Nevertheless,
his study is a valuable source for studying them retrospectively. Different authors in Georgia
Ablaze do not necessarily have the same understanding of the state of affairs and ethnic conflicts
in Georgia. Paula Garb, for example regards these conflicts from the perspectives of South
Ossetians and Abkhazians vis-a-vis Georgia (and the West), rather than from the perspective of
Georgians vis-a-vis Russia.15 Therefore, War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia Ablaze – and
to my knowledge any other comprehensive book until now – fails to address univocally, and
with solid consensus, the root causes of ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the
Russian-Georgian War of 2008 for that matter. It is not a shortcoming of such books as that did
not constitute their primary purpose of writing. However, trying to reintegrate and analyze and
reflect upon different (causal) narratives of the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, the Civil War and
ethno-territorial conflicts will be a most welcome suggestion as a theme for new studies.16
James J. Coyle’s recent book, entitled Russia’s Border Wars and Frozen Conflicts, is a useful
study because he puts the current ‘frozen’ unterminated separatist conflicts in a wider political
and legal context.17 It is valuable because it discusses the diverging Russian and Western per-
spectives with regard to these conflicts, notably those in Ukraine and also in Syria. Despite being
very critical of the Western attitude towards these conflicts, Coyle’s perspective remains a
Western one, as he clearly comes with policy advice for the West and NATO.18 Georgia regards
Russia as a former colonizer, occupier and an imperialist entity. However, it is neither scholarly
practice, nor very useful in general, to begin a demonizing game. For Georgia and a large part
of the post-Soviet space Russia fulfils a similar role as the USA does globally and that the UK did
until the early twentieth century. In addition, as mentioned earlier, Russia has its own security
concerns because of the ethnic map of the region. Aggression can be condemned. However, it is
not very easy to single out Russia; as the USA acts as a global police force, it is not very
farfetched to imagine that Russia also wants to act similarly in its former colonies (i.e.
post-Soviet Eurasia).
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All studies which, after a period of time, reflect upon conflicts are valuable as they pay atten-
tion to the newly changed, and changing, global and local political landscapes and Coyle’s book
is therefore no exception. Such studies usually offer insights and facts that were unnoticed or
underestimated before. The power of Coyle’s book lies in its discussion of ethnoterritorial wars in
the post-Soviet space after the annexation of Crimea, separatism in Eastern Ukraine and the
Syrian Conflict. Never before in the past 30 years have relations between the West and Russia
been worse. Despite its strengths, I also disagree with Coyle in many instances. Most notably, I
cannot agree with him that the new world order, which he regards as a Western product, pro-
hibits separatism and cherishes the territorial integrity of countries.19 This has arguably only
been so after the Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. By consulting press and
media material from the end of the 1980s and early 1990s every observer could note that the
West had taken a euphoric attitude, at times silently but at other times loudly, supporting separ-
atism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia which has even-
tually resulted in the recognition of unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo from
Serbia by the West and a lot of other countries.
Wars, political stability and transitions in Tajikistan and Georgia
Epkenhans and Wheatley try to offer understandings and explanations for the recent political his-
tories of Tajikistan and Georgia respectively. Their studies and methodologies also fit agent-
based types of explanations in addition to structure-based ones. Although it is largely true that
Epkenhans’s approach is primarily an agent-based one, this is not completely true of Wheatley’s
study. Wheatley, inspired by works of Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter,20 believes that
‘structured contingency’ is the best way of looking at Georgian regime transition, and similar to
(other) path-dependent approaches believes that decisions taken in critical phases can co-deter-
mine future political history. Epkenhans applies thick description, discourse analysis and qualita-
tive reflective methods. His design of study, which could best be called comparative discourse
analysis, is designed in a way that makes his approach, though not necessarily his conclusions,
agent-based.
In order to discuss the path to the Rose revolution, Wheatley identifies five critical phases in
the history of modern Georgia that eventually led to the Rose Revolution.21 The first was the vio-
lent suppression of Georgian nationalist uprisings on 9 April 1989. This damaged the communist
elite to the extent that there was no reconciliation possible with them, at least for some time.
The second critical phase was the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurida. This was a time when the
state institutions had nearly totally collapsed, a war in South Ossetia was begun, and even
though it still did not officially separate itself from Georgia, the ethno-nationalist conflict in
Abkhazia had already begun. Gamsakhurdia’s era was also a time of civil war during which differ-
ent factions and warlords stood against each other. Somehow unable to govern the country, and
perhaps also to consolidate their gains, mainly against the supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,
Tengiz Sigua a former dissident politician, and paramilitary chiefs, better known as warlords Jaba
Ioseliani and Tengiz Kitovani, invited Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet minister of foreign
affairs (1985–1991) and the Georgian Communist Party’s first Secretary (1972–1985), to do so.
Indeed, the third critical phase was the consolidation of Shevardnaze’s power, which culminated
in the adoption of a new constitution, the fourth phase. However, the power of Shevardnadze
was not absolute and eventually dissent, mainly from reformers and a younger generation of
politicians, grew to a considerable extent. Allegedly, the re-election of Shevardnadze in 2001, the
fifth critical phase, was fraudulent. Since that time, the fall of Shevardnadze’s regime was gaining
more and more momentum, notably under the leadership of reformers such as Zurab Zhvania
and Mikheil Saakashvili who was eventually elected in 2004 and held the office of president of
Georgia until 2013. Following Wheatley’s methodology, perhaps, two other critical phases should
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be distinguished, which may answer his question as to whether the Rose Revolution had
brought about a significantly new type of political regime or simply repackaged the old one.
These critical phases were the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, and Saakashvili’s, and his political
associates’ peaceful departure from office after their party, the United National Movement, was
defeated first in the parliamentary election and then in the presidential election (2013). For this
and other reasons, Wheatley’s question could be answered positively even though many of the
former practices have proven to be resilient, yet less pervasively than before, the Georgian polit-
ical regime was indeed significantly and substantially changed.
Despite the fact that Wheatley’s applied model of critical phases invites an agent or actor-
driven explanation, his explanation of Georgia’s Rose Revolution is mainly structure driven. The
same can be said of the history of ethnoterritorial conflicts and Georgian political history in gen-
eral. Although, it is true that certain figures such as Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze and Saakashvili
have played pivotal roles in Georgian political history, their acts were constrained and mediated
by longstanding structural conditions. I agree with Wheatley’s findings in general. Wheatley’s
study, even though a qualitative analysis, is robust, and his conclusions are convincing. However,
after nearly two decades, reflection upon some of his conclusions requires some adjustments
and qualification. Therefore, I also will discuss my views where they differ from those
of Wheatley.
Wheatley identifies a number of conditions that as causal factors explain the occurrence of
the Rose Revolution in Georgia. According to him, these conditions are Georgian Culture, the
Soviet legacy of governance, the typical constitution of 1995, (lack of) nationalism, contagion
from abroad, extensive presence of foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and capital,
and neutrality of the USA and Russia. However, as will be discussed further below, I believe that
the last two decades of Georgian history teach us different conclusions with regard to neutrality.
Wheatley’s identification of these conditions is also useful in understanding the case of
Tajikistan. Below I will discuss these conditions and examine the extent to which they can
explain the civil wars, ethnoterritorial wars and political transitions in general in Georgia
and Tajikistan.
According to Wheatley, Georgian culture, in the context of typically hierarchical Soviet admin-
istrative governance, strengthens clientelism. I can agree with Wheatley that Georgian culture
ideally values friendship. One has to be loyal to family, friends and colleagues and there is no
sharp distinction between business and personal life. Wheatley is also right that the Georgian
patriarchal culture burdens men with the protection of women. Assaulting and insulting women
is strongly despised. The fact that among those killed on 9 April 1989 – when the communist
government’s militia opened fire on demonstrators – were many women, alarmed and touched a
sensitive chord in Georgian society. Since that time no peaceful negotiation with the Soviet
establishment, often associated with the Russian colonialism, has been possible, and hence
nationalist figures such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia were able to take advantage of the political
forum for their own ends. The cultural factor is also valid in the case of Tajikistan. However, it
needs some qualification. The notions of dignity and honour are also valid in Tajikistani society
where, similar to Georgian society, a patriarchal culture also prevails. However, it is debatable
whether the cultural factors have played a similar role in the courses of conflicts and political
transitions in Tajikistan and Georgia to the same extent. It is fair to say that despite religious sim-
ilarities, the Georgian attitude vis-a-vis Russia was more negative, and the perception of danger
about the violation, and hence focus on the preservation, of their country’s territorial integrity
has been stronger in Georgia compared with the case in Tajikistan. One possible reason may be,
paradoxically, the religious similarity itself, as Russia, after incorporating Georgia into the Russian
Empire, had dissolved the Georgian Kingdom and abolished the autocephalous Georgian
Orthodox Church and incorporated it in the Russian Orthodox Church. Another probable reason,
somehow related to the former one, is the degree of Russification. The percentage of Russians
both in Dushanbe and Tajikistan in total was larger compared with those in Tbilisi and Georgia
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as a whole. Indeed, the Russian language has had, and still has, a much stronger position in
Tajikistan than it did and does in Georgia. In contrast to Georgia most secondary schools and
universities in Tajikistan used Russian as their language of instruction.
The fact that Tajikistan does not border Russia is yet another possible reason. It may be fair
to maintain that Uzbekistan fulfils a similar role as a large strong neighbour in relation to
Tajikistan as it does with most other Central Asian countries. Another reason is the fact that in
the case of Tajikistan Russia is not the main adversary to the country’s territorial integrity as the
political history has demonstrated in the case of Georgia. Tajikistani territorial grievances are pri-
marily directed towards Uzbekistan, a country that has incorporated main ‘Tajik’, that is, Persian-
speaking, areas in the provinces of Samarkand, Bukhara and Surkhan Darya. Perhaps the very his-
torical legacy of attitude towards, and emotional attachment for, territorial integrity itself is yet
another possible reason. Mountainous areas of the Caucasus have a history of rebellion against
Russia and other imperial powers, and this freedom-loving attitude may have influenced
Georgian political culture until today. It is also important to note that Tajikistan had already lost
the afore-mentioned Tajik-speaking areas in central and south Uzbekistan before the collapse of
the Soviet Union and Tajikistani independence, whereas Georgian territorial integrity was effect-
ively violated during the collapse of the Soviet Union and after Georgian independence. These
historical and cultural factors, may partially explain the fact that Georgia, in contrast to Tajikistan,
has adopted a geopolitical orientation more towards the West than towards Russia, and rather
strong anti-Russian sentiments in general.
The second condition mentioned by Wheatley is the existence of a shadow political economy.
This condition was strongly present in both republics. I agree with Wheatley and Epkenhans that
in Georgia and Tajikistan, respectively, there existed a shadow economy that was connected to
certain political figures. As Wheatley maintains, ‘By the late Gorbachev period, criminal networks
also played a major role in most republics of the USSR. Criminal bosses, or vory v zakone (thieves
in law), had considerable authority not only in the criminal world but also amongst society at
large, particularly in cultural settings (such as Georgia) where a certain romanticism was associ-
ated with the profession of the thief.’22 I do not agree with him that thieves are valued positively
in Georgian culture. Today Georgia is, indeed, one of the safest places in the post-Soviet space.
However, as mentioned earlier, in the Caucasus, particularly in its mountainous parts, people
have a mentality of noble warriors, they value fighting against oppression and certain Robin
Hood-like figures are renowned for their bravery in Caucasian (oral) histories.23 As both cases,
that is, Georgia and Tajikistan, indicate the existence of shadow economies or ‘markets of vio-
lence’,24 availability of weapons and manpower by defection of law enforcement specialists and
availability of mercenaries often called ‘Rackets’ were instrumental in the mobilization of
armed militias.25
The third condition mentioned by Wheatley is the Soviet organizational legacy of governance.
Both republics were subject to and shaped by the hierarchical ethno-territorial manifestations of
the Soviet nationalities policy. By virtue of this policy large ethnic groups were awarded a union
republic – which ultimately became the 15 independent successor states of the Soviet Union
after its collapse – whereas smaller ethnic groups were awarded lower ranking autonomous
republics or provinces within some union republics. These were Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
Georgia and Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan. The Pamiris – who in contrast to the Sunni and
Persian-speaking (West Iranian) (other) Tajiks were Ismaili Shi’ites and spoke a few related Pamiri
(East Iranian) languages – constitute the majority of the population in Gorno-Badakhshan
autonomous province. Indeed, until the Soviet Census of 1939 the Pamiri people and Tajiks were
registered as separate ethnic groups. In consecutive censuses they were merged into the Tajik
census category, but they continue to demonstrate cultural and political peculiarities. Several
studies showed that these ‘ethnic autonomies’ were instrumental in the nationalist mobilization
of population.26
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According to Wheatley, another Soviet legacy was its practice of governance in which political
graft corruption was widespread and in which breaking the laws and using kompromat, that is,
compromising material, was a means of control. Although I am not sure whether it is correct to
speak about widespread corruption in the former Soviet Union, corrupt practices did occur there
frequently. In this respect Tajikistan and Georgia were very similar.
Another condition was nationalism. The hierarchical ethnoterritorial system in the Soviet
Union encouraged ethnonationalism as it offered certain privileges to ethnic groups who lived in
their titular territories.27 Ardent ethnonationalist resurgence prevailed during the last days of the
Soviet Union. These demonstrations were either centred around outright political issues, or
around social, environmental or economic issues but demonstrated in each case an ethnonation-
alist character as the mobilization occurred along ethnic lines. The aforementioned protest on 9
April 1989 was such a case in Georgia that was aimed at the alleged Russian/Soviet instigation
of ethnic separatism in Georgia. In Tajikistan, two events deserve attention: the demonstration
against the alleged affirmative housing policy for Armenians in Dushanbe, who supposedly
arrived in Dushanbe after they fled the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (11
February 1990).28 In addition, as the place of Islam in Tajik national identity has been a contested
issue, the protests at the two squares in Dushanbe could also be regarded as such protest. In
the protest that could be regarded as the beginning of the Tajikistani Civil War, protestors in
Lenin Square, renamed Ozodi (Freedom Square), supported the secular government, whereas the
demonstrators at the T-crossing of Putovsky (now Ismoil Somoni) Street and Lenin (now Rudaki)
Boulevard, named Shahidon (martyrs) after the riots of February 1990, proposed a more promin-
ent place for Islam in Tajikistan (25 March 1992). It should be mentioned that the protests on 25
March were initiated by the regionalist Pamiri party, La’li Badakhshan, and also attracted secular
oppositional parties but was dominated later by Islamists after the Islamic Renaissance Party of
Tajikistan joined the protests.29 Although the number of protests was low in Central Asia com-
pared with the Caucasus and the Baltics, as mentioned before, Tajikistan had a relatively high
number of protests and a high rate of participation per capita in protests.30 Wheatley correctly
mentions that the nature of Soviet society has left the society with a weak class awareness and
a strong identity politics that remains a serious issue of political activism.31
Wheatley also points to the constitution of Georgia (adopted in 1995) in Shevardnadze’s era,
which promoted contested oligarchy.32 This atypical constitution abolished the Cabinet of
Ministers and put each individual ministry under the direct but loose monitoring of the presi-
dent. As a result, different ‘enclaves’ of the state – the State Chancellery, the Parliament,
Government of Adjara and individual ministries – could function and even participate in eco-
nomic life fairly autonomously. This constitution enhanced political clientelism and oligarchy. A
more important condition, which could be explained by the constitution and Georgian political
culture at that time, was the fact that the elected parliaments were not true representations of
the citizens but an arena of contestation between a few factions. Arguably, Georgia after the
Rose Revolution has either remained a contested oligarchy or has moved towards representative
democracy. There is evidence for both positions. On the other hand, the Tajikistani party-political
landscape displays an increasing centralization as President Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party
of Tajikistan dominates the parliament and official state positions. The Islamic Renaissance Party
that was able to function for a time as an opposition party was labelled a terrorist organization
and banned from parliamentary and political activism. The party-political landscape of Georgia
remains somehow volatile. However, in no sense does it display signs of centralization and mon-
opolization of power by one party as is the case in Tajikistan. It is also not very likely to happen
as Georgia has signed an association agreement with the European Union. Hence the European
Union assists Georgia in many spheres as long as Georgia fulfils certain formal and demo-
cratic criteria.
A very important condition mentioned by Wheatley is the existence of a large number of
Western NGOs in Georgia, and I may add to that foreign aid in general. Georgia has been one of
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the post-Soviet republics that has attracted a lot of foreign NGOs and aid. Amongst these was
George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, which are often alleged to have orchestrated or at
least assisted the Rose Revolution. Tajikistan also attracted a number of NGOs. Nevertheless,
these were not as large a number compared with those in Georgia. Even only in Central Asia,
the number of foreign NGOs in Tajikistan was still fewer than in Kyrgyzstan. However, a more
important issue is the fact that these NGOs provided income to a significant part of the popula-
tion in Georgia, in an economy in which the state was unable to produce much in the way of
public goods or offer employment to a significant part of the population.33
Contagion is yet another condition mentioned by Wheatley. He mentions that the revolution
in Georgia followed those in Serbia and Ukraine. One may add Kyrgyzstan to the list. Tajikistan
saw a different path as in Tajikistan part of the former elite eventually became victors in the pol-
itical process. Contagion was also a condition that played a role in the civil and ethno-territorial
conflicts which took place nearly at the same time all around the Soviet Union. The mechanism
of contagion is present in the ‘mosaic type of ethno-geographic configuration’ that enhances
ethno-nationalism and increases the chance of the emergence of ethno-territorial conflicts.34
Wheatley mentions the neutrality of the USA and Russia in Georgia’s political affairs as yet
another condition. Even though I do not fully agree with Wheatley in this regard, it is imaginable
that these countries may have been neutral before the Rose Revolution and notably before the re-
occurrence and manifest internationalization of ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia. After the Rose
Revolution and the closing down of the Russian military basis in southern Georgia (2007), Georgia
has charted a Western course. It also made Russia increasingly worried because Georgia bordered
the North Caucasian region of Russia and the separatist regions in Georgia were populated by eth-
nic groups whose ethnic kin lived over the border in Russia. Ossetians live on both sides of the bor-
der, whereas Abkhazians’ ethnic kin in Russia is the neighbouring Adygheyans, the Cherkess and
the Kabardians, collectively called Circassians, and the Abazas. A likely reason that Russia agreed
with letting down Shevardnadze was that perhaps Russia had lost its temper with Shevardnadze’s
lack of control of Pankisi Gorge, which, according to Russia, harboured a significant number of
Salafi (pro-)Chechen fighters. The fact that Russia did not support its ally, Abashidze, then the presi-
dent of the Adjaran autonomous republic is perhaps also a sign that Russia did not initially oppose
the Rose Revolution.35 A fact that may corroborate this is the existence of too many Western
(financed) NGOs and pro-Western reformists already in pre-revolutionary Georgia, and Russia may
not have been afraid of further Westernization as it was deemed to have reached its peak. Perhaps
another important reason that Russia let Shevardnadze down was his unpopularity among the for-
mer communist hardliners, who had become proponents of the geopolitical code of Eurasianism,
and perhaps the Russian accusations of Wahhabi/Salafi fighters in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia was
not just a rhetoric and that Russia genuinely believed that these fighters making use of
Shevardnadze’s weak government infiltrated Chechnya and assisted factions of Chechen fighters.
After the recognition of the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia could hardly
be seen as a neutral power in Georgian geopolitical affairs. After one decade, it is fair to say that
the USA’s position towards the Rose Revolution was not neutral. The USA might have been cautious
in the beginning and have been waiting for a fait accompli yet could welcome the regime change
in Georgia with open arms. Georgia is attractive for NATO, because it is located in a strategic place
between the Middle East and Russia and hence NATO could exploit its uneasy political historical
relations with Russia. As Turkey is already a NATO member, Georgian membership of NATO could
be a possible and viable option. The same could be said about Ukraine, which also borders NATO
countries. Tajikistan, in contrast, did not share the same political history and geopolitical location.
For this reason, Western interest in post-independence Georgia has been and remains much higher
than it was and is in Tajikistan, a country that remains under the Russian-dominated Eurasian struc-
tures, that is, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Tajikistan is also in the
process of accession to the Eurasian Economic Union.
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Wheatley also mentions the predominance of a certain degree of consent among the political
elite in Georgia. Indeed, there existed a large degree of consensus among the Georgian political
elite, and even among ordinary citizens, that the separatist territories should be recovered and
hence there was also sensitivity towards Russia, if not outright Russophobia, which in turn encour-
ages a Western orientation, in addition to consensus about political and economic reforms.
Perhaps maintaining mirostroitelstvo (peacebuilding in Russian) or Tinji (wellness/peacefulness
in Tajik) could be called a case of consensus in Tajikistan.36 Epkenhans maintains that discussion
of the Civil War had become a kind of taboo in Tajikistan, which was not enthusiastically talked
about. However, as Epkenhans observed a recent change of attitude meant that the Civil War
began to be discussed cautiously. Some colleagues maintain that an ‘illiberal peace’ exists in
Tajikistan.37 It is premature to speak with any precision about whether there is a large consensus
among the Tajikistani population about all aspects of this mode of peacebuilding. However, the
political and social affairs in Tajikistan may testify to such a consensus to certain degree.38 One
should be aware of the fact that the current global situation is very advantageous for President
Rahmon. As the Wahhabi/Salafi groups have also created havoc in the West, there happened to
be a greater sympathy for secular authoritarian regimes which ban their Islamist opponents in
the name of defending civil liberties and order. As many authors (as Coyle)39 have correctly
noted, the recent geopolitical situation, notably the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, drive the
West and Russia further away from each other, and there are no tangible signs of change visible
in Tajikistani (geo)political orientation as of early 2018. However, despite its state of stability and
peace and ‘even though a widespread apolitical mood prevails in post-conflict Tajikistan, still the
danger of violent conflict initiated by Wahhabi/Salafi militants remains real’.40
Wheatley’s approach of critical phases allows some degree of voluntarism and liberty of action for
political actors and agents. However, regarding his choice of factors (conditions) it is clear that his
approach is predominantly a structure-based one. In contrast, it is clear that Epkenhans holds an
agent-based approach. He even maintains that the civil war in Tajikistan is best explained by contin-
gency and interaction between politicians and notably warlords. Perhaps it is fair to say that the course
of the civil war as it unleashed in Tajikistan did indeed depend on personal agendas of politicians and
warlords. Nevertheless, I believe that the dynamics and the result of that war were primarily deter-
mined by structures. Epkenhans truly mentions that regionalism is too often discussed as one reason,
or perhaps the most prominent reason, behind the Tajikistani Civil War. Even though he does not main-
tain it wholeheartedly his rich description of the actions and tactics of Sangak Safarov, the warlord
from Kulob, suggests that the Kulobi faction emerged as the victor out of the War because of Sangak
Safarov, and Sangak Safarov just happened to be from Kulob. However, I believe that the ascendance
of Kulob was not accidental. Indeed, the elite from Leninobod (now Khujand) dominated the political
life of Communist Tajikistan.41 That is not very strange as Leninobod was the sole urban centre when
Tajikistan was established as a Soviet republic. However, in the course of time, other regions of
Tajikistan were urbanized and Kulob is now the most populous region of Tajikistan. Kulobis are indeed
the largest ethnographic groups of Tajiks. In addition to these facts, Khujand, the administrative centre
of the Sughd province, is separated from the rest of Tajikistan by high mountains which make the
transportation to the rest of the country very difficult and nearly impossible in the winter. During
Soviet times, transportation between the northern and southern parts of Tajikistan usually went via
Uzbekistan. Therefore, due to these structural factors, population and location, it was very likely, if not
totally predictable, that Kulobis would eventually come out of the civil war as the primary victors.
Cultural and geopolitical orientations
In its recent history, the aversion towards Russia was probably much higher in Georgia than in
Tajikistan and there was consensus even in Shevardnadze’s era that the country should have a
Western geopolitical orientation – such an orientation was advocated to varying degrees by
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different political currents. In Georgia, a nationalism existed in which the Georgian Orthodox
Church had a central role and place but remained secular in many respects. In Tajikistan, how-
ever, even though a sense of Tajik nationalism existed, it became a bipolar nationalism: Yurchiks
vs. Vovchiks. As Epkenhans describes, Yurchiks were secular Tajiks associated with Russians.
Vovchik is a diminution of Wahhabi and referred to extreme conservative Islamists.42 Therefore, a
secular and irreligious Tajik nationalism was associated with Russia and with communists and
Islamists were associated with Islamist fighters in Afghanistan, Chechnya and elsewhere, and per-
haps also with Basmachi rebels of early twentieth-century Central Asia. Therefore, religion had an
uneasy relationship with Tajik nationalism, whereas it did not with the Georgian nationalism. In
Georgia, the consensus was that Georgian Orthodox Christianity had an instrumental and func-
tional position in Georgian identity. In contrast, no consensus existed about the relationship of
Islam with Tajik identity. Tajiks were Muslims, and Islamic rituals play a significant role in Tajik
culture. However, different opinions existed and exist about the degree of incorporation of
(political) Islam in the social and political lives of an independent (secular) Tajikistan.
The Soviet state authorities have always been involved in regulating and even engineering
cultural lives of ethnic groups and territories. As a result of such Soviet legacy, the Tajikistani
authorities intervene rather intensively with the material and immaterial, political economic,
social and cultural lives of the country. Any traveller to Tajikistan can observe frescoes and
murals that depict flower motifs alien to Tajikistan and more at home in China or Western Asia.
Objects are displayed in museums or as urban fora of arts (such as murals and statues), which
may be interpreted in one way or another to relate to Tajikistan, even if not found in the terri-
tory of Tajikistan, or even if in many cases their linkages with Tajikistan or Tajik culture and his-
tory are interpreted too liberally – for example, the Samanid Mausoleum in Bukhara in
Uzbekistan and Manichean paintings in China. However, they also include those objects, which
are clearly alien to the Central Asian country of Tajikistan, such as pre-Islamic Iranian
Achaemenid or Sasanian paintings or petroglyphs. The assemblage of all these forms of art gives
at times an unlikely ‘artificial’ impression.43 Recognizing their cultural and historical affinity with
Afghanistan, it is to be expected that Tajikistani arts and culture shows similarity with Afghani
ones. However, Afghanistan is also associated by many members of the Tajikistani elite as a risk
factor, as the Islamist militants are still active in that country.44
Unlike in Georgia, where consensus exists about the cultural heritage and also political orien-
tation of the country, no such consensuses seem to exist yet in Tajikistan. A sense of confusion
or ambiguity has been manifest in Tajikistan in the recent (political) past: at least three currents
have competed and at times allied or fought with each other. One is the Soviet or Imperial
Russian past which is a symbol of progress for some but subjugation for others. The second is
Islamism and the third is Iranism (rather than Central Asianism). Despite his uneasy relationship
with Islamic movements, and perhaps in order to neutralize the extremist Wahhabi/Salafi type
Islamism, President Rahmon announced 2009 as the year of Imam A’zam Abu Hanifa, the foun-
der of the Hanafi madhab, or school, of Sunni Islam. As the vast majority of the Tajikistani peo-
ple, with the notable exception of the Pamiri minority who are ‘Ismaili’ Shi’ites, are Hanafi
Sunnis, the Tajikistani authorities are not very concerned about the Shi’ite Islamic ideology of the
Iranian state and hence – unlike the authorities in the republic of Azerbaijan – permit and even
cherish Iranism, detached from its specific Twelver Shi’ite Islamic connotations, in the cultural life
of the country. Iranism in Tajikistan, despite the manifold obvious Turkic influences on Tajik cul-
ture, dares to wrestle with a competing Turkism, much more than is the case in Iran where the
Turkic cultures of the Middle East and Central Asia are regarded as a subset of Iranian culture
(also called Turco-Persian civilization). However, even clearly visible in the social and cultural life
of Tajikistan, Iranism should not be exaggerated either, as the Russian cultural influence is more
substantial and fundamental, and as the political elite of Tajikistan are educated in the Soviet
system. In addition, the economic ties between Tajikistan and Russia, China and Turkey are
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stronger than between Tajikistan and Iran. Unlike in Georgia, the West, Europe and NATO are
absent from the foreground of the political landscape of Tajikistan.
In Georgia, Christianity and Westernism or Europeanism have an uneasy love–hate relation.
They manifest a competition of modernity (West) and tradition (Orthodox Christianity). More
than a century of a turbulent relationship with Russia has caused a neglect of the fact or perhaps
purposeful denial in public awareness in Georgia that Western modernity came into Georgia via
the similarly Christian Orthodox Russia. In fact, Russian Imperialism created a sentiment that
Russianism was a yoke on the shoulder of Georgia that had its own European credentials, per-
haps much more than Eurasian Russia had as an heir to empires of Eurasia ruled by equestrian
hordes. Accordingly, the history of Georgian contacts with Europe, without the intervention of
Russia, is cherished in Georgia: for example, the Georgian Sulkhan Saba Orbeliani, a seventeenth
century author and an emissary to France and Vatican, or Jean Chardin, a seventeenth century
French traveller, who visited the Caucasus on his journeys to Safavid Persia. Georgians usually
state that they ‘want to become Europeans’, not that they ‘are Europeans’. Most Georgians are
aware of the European bias and know that the reality of their cultural embeddedness is more
complex.45 It is worth remembering that although a large share of Georgians in Georgia are
Christians, when Georgians in Iran (Shi’ite Muslims) and the Georgians, and their relatives the
Laz, in Turkey (Sunni Muslims) are counted, the share of Muslim Georgians worldwide becomes
significant. It is not clear whether they outnumber the Christian Georgians, but it certainly balan-
ces their number. It is not always clear what constitutes a Western or European orientation;
whether these are European values related to enlightenment or it is just Christianity.
Europeanism and Western orientation may have opponents; however, it is the hegemonic
geopolitical orientation in Georgia, for they provide Georgia welfare and security, mainly against
perceived threats from Russia.
Although nothing can be forecast with certainty in international relations, there are as yet no
signs that the cultural and (in many ways the interrelated) geopolitical world orientations of
Tajikistan – that is, Russian-oriented Eurasianism – and Georgia – that is, cautiously pro-West and
notably oriented towards the EU – will change in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Structural factors, most notably geographical location and cultural factors, are crucial in under-
standing the difference of outcome between the international orientation of Tajikistan and
Georgia. Hence, similar processes that began almost simultaneously in two small Soviet republics
could eventually end in two very different outcomes.
Both countries have experienced civil wars and ethno-territorial separatism. However,
Tajikistan was more affected by civil war, and less so by separatism, than Georgia. Nevertheless,
the outcomes are very different. Georgia experienced a revolution after one decade of oligarchic
pluralism formed by an uneasy coalition of former communists and reformers. In Tajikistan, how-
ever, the former communists could consolidate and nearly monopolize political lives. Because of
its location and religious similarity with the West (Christianity), there is a consensus in Georgia
that a Western orientation is a viable destiny for that country.46 This orientation, itself, is for a
significant part also caused by the large influence of Western or Western-funded domestic NGOs.
Such NGOs were very active in Georgia, whereas they were much less present in Tajikistan.
Georgia borders Russia and, historically, has had uneasy relations with Russia and therefore
was more interesting for the West. Tajikistan’s traditional main ‘Other’ is not Russia but the
regionally stronger Uzbekistan. It also borders Afghanistan and China. Therefore, it welcomes
Russian and Chinese influence in its political and economic lives, particularly in the spheres of
trade and security.
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The legacy of the Soviet political system is still visible in all post-Soviet republics, albeit to dif-
ferent degrees. In addition, territorial, geographical and cultural, in other words ethnogeopoliti-
cal, factors are instrumental in order to explain the similarities and dissimilarities of the recent
political history of both countries, Tajikistan and Georgia.47 The best way to understand and
explain political affairs in one country is an in-depth qualitative study. However, as these books
have demonstrated comparison between relevant cases may offer valuable factual knowledge
and theoretical insight.
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